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D1CEDENT ESTAT9S
Consfrucfion Of Will
In re Hosford's Will' was a proceeding for the construction of a will to
determine persons entitled to the remainder of a trust. All the complexities
of a class gift were present,2 but the court had no trouble in resolving the problems by merely finding the intent of the testator.
The residuary estate was given in trust for testator's wife during her life,
then to be divided into three equal parts, with one part being subdivided "into
as many shares or portions as I may have grandchildren surviving me," and the
testamentary trustees were directed "to pay the income from one such share unto
each of such grandchildren for and during the term of its natural life and upon
its death to pay the principal sum from which it has been receiving the income
unto its issue,*if any, and if it leaves no such issue, unto my remaining grandchildren
in equal shares or portions, the children of any such grandchildren who may be
then dead to take the share or portion which their parent would have received
had it lived."
Was it the testators intent that a grandchild born a year and a half after
testator's death was to share in the principal of the terminated trust as one of the
"remaining grandchildren?" That is, did the unqualified language, "my remaining
grandchildren," encompass afterborn grandchildren and thus all grandchildren who
were alive when the contingency occurred, or was it limited by reference back to
those grandchildren who were alive at the time of the death of testator and who
had been previously designated as "grandchildren surviving me?"
The Surrogate's Court3 found a limitation by reference back to the previous
clause, based on Matter of Watson's Will, 4 where a clause providing for "said surviving grandchildren" was interpreted as referring to the grandchildren who were
living at the time of testator's death.
The Appellate Division affirmed, 5 with one dissent in which Matter of Watson's Wil6 was distinguished. The dissent maintained that "said," as used in the
Watson case, related back to the antecedent phrase which was limited to those
surviving at the death of the testatrix.
1. 309 N. Y. 23, 127 N. E. 2d 735 (1955).
2. Class gift as within the accepted definition contained in Herzog v. TitZe

Guaranty & Trust Co., 177 N. Y. 86, 69 N. E. 283 (1903).

3. 203 Misc. 146, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 138 (1952).
4. 262 N. Y. 284, 186 N. E. 787 (1933).
5. 282 App. Div. 1026, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 886 (1st Dep't 1953).

6. Note 4, supra.
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The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that testator intended to provide for
afterborn grandchildren. The court stressed the fact that the testator could not
establish a trust for the life of a grandchild not in being at the time of his death,
for that would have violated the rule against perpetuities 7 The court also used
other sections of the will to show that testator wanted to provide for afterborn
grandchildren, thus once again affirming the appropriateness of examining other
portions of a will for the purpose of ascertaining testator's intention." While
speculative, since the court acted under the cloak of intention, it is suggested that
the court may have been influenced by Professor Casner's statement,0 cited in the
appellants brief.' 0
It should be noticed that by the court's decision, since the class determination
of testator's grandchildren was at the date of the last life tenant's death and not at
the date of testator's death, futurity attached to the gift." That is, vesting took
place in those who answered the description at the time of distribution.' 2 Where
a gift to a class is preceded by a life or trust estate, and no time has been designated
for the ascertainment of the identity of the class, membership will be determined
as of the date of the termination of the intervening trust.' 3 Thus, the court has
not followed its favored policy of early vesting.
The opinion is also of interest for its brevity. Even though futurity attached,
there was no suggestion of the application of the "divide and pay over" rule, thus
once again lending support to the statement: "that . . . the only rule actually
applied by the courts is that the expressed intention of the person creating the
remainder governs; and the troublesome divide and pay over rule is merely a
4
canon of construction to get at such intention.'
7. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAV § 11; REAL PROPERTY LAW § 42; Beitz v. Faversham,
205 N. Y. 197, 98 N. E. 385 (1912).
8. Livingston v. Ward, 247 N. Y. 97, 159 N. E. 875 (1928).
9. Casner, Class Gifts to Others than to 'Heirs, or 'Next of Ki/-Inreasein
the Class Membership, 51 HARV. L. R.V. 254 (1938).
10. Id. at 280: "It must be kept in mind that the probable desire of the
average transferor, when he describes his transferees by a group designation, is
to benefit as many persons who comply with the description as he can, without
at the same time causing too much inconvenience. Thus, his Intention might very
well be different as to the composition of the described class under different
provisions in the same instrument."
11. Salter v. Drowne, 205 N. Y. 204, 98 N. E. 401 (1912); N. Y. Life Ins. cG
Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93, 142 N. E. 431 (1923); Matter of Crane, 164
N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47 (1900); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 295 (1940).
12. Teed v. Morton, 60 N. Y. 502 (1875).
13. Matter of Pulis, 220 N. Y. 196, 115 N. E. 516 (1917); Matter of Coolidge,
85 App. Div. 295, 83 N. Y. Supp. 299 (3rd Dep't 1903), af'd 177 N. Y. 541, 69 N. E.
1121 (1904).
14. Gluck, The "Divide and Pay Over" Rule in New York, 24 COL. L. REv. 8
(1924).

